The Exploding Galaxy:

Historical Studies of Eighteenth-Century Britain

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The study of eighteenth-century British history has the energy and radiance of an exploding galaxy. It is but one of many within the historical cosmos. Yet it is a particularly challenging one. There is no interpretative consensus; and the galaxy’s fecund diversification makes it hard for individual researchers to follow all the strands – and even more difficult to draw them all together.

In terms of scale, British historians published in the 1990s more than 20,000 books and articles relating to the years between 1700 and 1800.¹ Moreover, these abundant ‘units of output’ – to borrow the unlovely terminology of University research assessment - exclude all works published outside Britain by overseas scholars and all relevant studies in cognate disciplines, such as literature or the history of art.

Since then, the ferment shows no sign of abating. On the contrary. The eighteenth-century history galaxy constantly spreads its tentacles into the terrain of the later seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Hence its remit runs well beyond its nominal span from 1700 to 1800. To accommodate this elasticity, it is familiarly known by scholars as the Long eighteenth century. The dynastic labels of Georgian or Hanoverian also remain current, although in practice an eclectic array of non-monarchical start and end dates are deployed.² As a result, the eighteenth century has already become ‘long’, is getting longer, and ought to remain so - within a longitudinal discipline.
1: Multiplying Strands

To cope with such magnitude, the period is *de facto* divided into many distinctive strands. Each tends to look to journals, conferences, and networks focusing upon its particular specialist theme through time. Much research focuses upon England (with Wales the rarely mentioned adjunct) but Scotland and Ireland have their own terrains within the galaxy, while some studies encompass Britain as a whole.

During the last 50 years, the number of special strands has multiplied, with different ones waxing and waning in popularity - as the following schematic outline indicates. *Political history* and its satellite *constitutional history* have been continually active, although not predominant, aided by the regular appearance of political-history questions in standard examinations. *Intellectual history*, also termed the history of ideas, has similarly remained lively and suitably argumentative in its smaller niche. *Music history* and *art history* (reviewed separately) remain semi-autonomous, being much smaller but also flourishing, as are *military* and *naval history*.

At the same time, new strands successively emerge, here responding to wider trends across the historical firmament. *Economic history* was a big growth area in the 1960s and 1970s; followed by *urban history* and *local history* in the 1970s; and *social history* from the 1970s onwards, plus the *history of science/medicine* (reviewed separately). Then in the 1980s and 1990s there were booms in *women's history*, the *history of the body*, the *history of sexuality*; and (belatedly) *men's history* – with both genders being gradually merged into a broader *gender history*, despite opposition from some feminist separatists. From the 1990s onwards, too, there was a revived *history of religion* (reviewed separately); and, especially, an explosion of *cultural history*, embracing all aspects of Britain’s ‘way of life’ as well as its ‘high’ (elite) culture. Meanwhile, *imperial history*, once a rather sedate off-shoot of political history, is flaring into new prominence. Not only does it intersect with a new global history and a reanimated economic history, but it also explores, with cultural history, significant issues of composite ‘identities’. ³

All these classifications remain imprecise at the margins. Nonetheless, a detailed breakdown of the publication statistics from the 1990s indicates that the greatest output
related to ‘cultural/intellectual/art history’ (over 9,000 items), matched closely by ‘social history’ (c.9,000 items), while, at the other end of the scale, there were a select number of new works on foreign policy (885) and technology (756).

After the millennium, this multi-stranded pattern has broadly continued. ‘Hot’ new areas of inquiry continually emerge, frequently stimulated by debates in the wider society. Recent innovations are: animal history; environmental history, gaining support from older traditions of historical geography (reviewed separately); and the history of the emotions. Thus laughter in the eighteenth century is shown as being tickled by the vigorous art market in satirical prints. Yet suicide offered a stark alternative, generating urgent debates in law and literature.4

Holding together this exploding galaxy is the coherent force of a common craft discipline among professional historians. Certainly, there are various tensions. ‘Hard’ economic history, especially in its ultra-quantified form, is denounced by some as too abstruse, technical, and student-repellent, while ‘soft’ cultural history is disparaged by others as too facile, unsystematic, and prone to assertion rather than proof. However, almost all practising historians firmly retain the view that the past is accessible to reasoned analysis.

Hence, while the so-called ‘cultural turn’ in the 1990s focused attention upon cultural ‘representations’ as encouraged by postmodernist theory, even the most ‘culturalist’ of the cultural historians did not endorse the postmodernist scepticism about studying the past.5 Instead, that philosophical position is in turn faltering. The fin-de-millennium doubts of the 1990s are giving way, by the 2010s, to a post-postmodernist intellectual robustness. And, as part of that shift, it is probable that the great boom in cultural history has peaked. Its strand of ‘thick description’ will richly survive but without flaring quite so predominantly – as has happened with earlier ‘flares’ such as gender history.

2: Enrichment of Resources

Meanwhile, new fire-power within the research galaxy is being generated by resource enrichment. Access to digitised data, via the world-wide web, is extending the historians’
traditional quest for novel sources and methodologies into a veritable ‘digital turn’. If anything, the next problem is becoming the risk of information overload. It is also possible that unwary new researchers may confine themselves to digitised sources, at the cost of failing to explore the rest. Yet these are the welcome challenges of innovation.

Not only are the mammoth resources of libraries, museums and archives being made available – such as the invaluable English Short Title Catalogue (ESTC) covering all printed works before 1801- but historians are creating novel resources by linking disparate collections. Two impressive websites set the standard: The Old Bailey Proceedings from 1674 to 1913, demonstrating the elastic length of the ‘long eighteenth’ century, and London Lives, 1690-1800. These have been pioneered by Tim Hitchcock and Bob Shoemaker, who seek to make available as many resources as possible for as many people as possible, including school-children and the often unfairly disparaged genealogists. And these websites are accordingly gargantuan. Thus London Lives contains almost 3.5 million records, drawn from 8 different archives and 15 datasets, collating multifarious eighteenth-century political, administrative, and legal resources.

Via this cornucopia, cross-linkages will reveal unexpected as well as expected life experiences. And new interpretations of historical change may emerge from evidence about ‘ordinary’ people (although both websites contain a number of aristocrats). Hitchcock in particular stresses the role of even the neediest beggar in the making of the modern state, either through accepting authority or through resisting it. He accordingly interprets the ‘people’ not as E.P. Thompson’s organised working-class, but as a multitude spreading from respectable artisans via the labouring poor to utter down-and-outs. The result is a Namierisation of social history. That is, these websites encourage Lewis Namier’s favoured methodological focus upon individual lives, albeit now using high-speed computer-power to do so.

Given the lack of standardisation within most sources, a major challenge is to link names correctly. This exercise turns out to be much more difficult than might be expected. For instance, the London Lives website contains 102 entries for William Blake between 1782 and 1820, during the poet/artist’s mature years (he died in 1827). Yet many others shared his
name. A close check reveals that only one record (listing his vote in the 1790 Westminster election) relates to the Blake of later fame. So a careful scrutiny is vital. To create false linkages is just as damaging as it is to miss genuine ones.

Many other projects (both completed or in progress) are also generating remarkable websites and databases. These relate variously to: probate inventories of household goods; workhouse admissions; trans-Atlantic slave voyages; the ‘electronic Enlightenment’; dissenting academies; electoral data; parliamentary proceedings; as well as the long-running Namier-inspired biographies of MPs in both mainland Britain and Ireland. The chronologies of these projects are generally dictated by the sources. So the Clergy of the Church of England Database (CCEd) starts at the 1540 Henrician Reformation and ends at the 1835 Reform Commission. Its resources from 50 archives across England and Wales should help to counteract the old semi-isolation of religious history and aid its interaction with political, social, cultural, local and family studies.

Eventually, there is a fascinating possibility that meta-links between websites may generate a parallel cyber-eighteenth-century in digitised data. Such a mega-resource will simultaneously exacerbate the mega-test of linking individuals accurately.

Nonetheless, exciting new outcomes are anticipated from these developments, which put eighteenth-century British history at the forefront of historical digitisation. The grant-giving bodies, which have provided substantial funding, are watching with interest too. But even millions of individual lives do not ‘speak for themselves’. It will take more, rather than less, effort for historians to contextualise, to analyse, and to debate this cornucopia.

3: Framing the Galaxy

Plenty of overarching narratives seek to explain Britain’s eighteenth-century history. What is lacking is consensus. However, the clash of rival views constitutes a further stimulus. Again in bald summary, there are three big frameworks. No-change is currently unfashionable. The boldest argument in its favour appeared in 1985, with the first edition of J.C.D. Clark’s English Society, 1688-1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice
during the Ancien Regime. He redesignated England before the 1832 Reform Act as an ancien regime, matching the monarchies of mainland Europe, and, additionally, as a confessional state (before the ending of religious disabilities in 1828-9). Strenuous debates followed. And the upshot? References to the confessional state have virtually disappeared, while the terminology of ancien regime is now comparatively rare. Above all, Clark’s provocative summary of eighteenth-century England as ‘Christian, monarchical, aristocratic, rural, traditional and poor’ hardly captures the country that produced the steam-engine and gained a global empire. In particular, as Britain’s imperial history returns into the mainstream, purely insular interpretations will not suffice.9

Generally, then, the arguments focus upon the respective merits of slow-change or revolutionary change. But historians disagree about the nature of the claimed transformations, let alone their dates and rates of development. Almost every change attributed to this era is also claimed for earlier periods – or for much later ones. Secularisation provides one example – being variously defined and dated from the sixteenth, the eighteenth, and/or the twentieth centuries.10


On that last question, most economic historians now agree that there was a momentous process of long-term industrialisation. Yet its causation remains disputed.11 Did Britain’s science-minded ‘knowledge economy’ spark innovation, as posited by Joel Mokyr? Or did many factors fuel the transformation, as argued by Ralph Allen: these factors including productive agriculture, expanding towns, diversifying manufactures, technological improvements, expansive mining, globalising trade (the slave trade, however, not given top billing), and, above all, relatively high wages, providing consumer power. ‘Culture’ versus ‘Economics’ – or both? These debates should interest economists as well as historians.
Contentious old issues in political history also refuse to die. Thus the revolutionary nature of the Glorious Revolution of 1688/9, having been down-graded by some, has been newly restated with vigour. Moreover, political transformation was not a one-off event. The complexity of reform post-1780 remains a live research strand. Reputations are perennially reassessed. George III is relatively rehabilitated (albeit at the expense of his ministers) as a unifying figurehead within Britain and not a tyrant in the colonies. The Duchess of Devonshire still glitters as a Whig political hostess, prompting a handsome film romp in 2008. And the Younger Pitt has his admirers, including among today’s conservative politicians. Above all, the contentious 1790s, which saw much cultural ferment as well as Britain’s first organised democratic movement, remain a hot topic. In this context, Pitt appears as a repressive figure, widening the remit of the Treason Laws, and encouraging the loyalist propaganda onslaught upon the thwarted radicals.\textsuperscript{12}

Simultaneously, John Styles puts material culture (literally) into social history. His study of eighteenth-century clothing leads him to oppose E.P. Thompson and others who saw an ‘immiseration’ lower-class living standards.\textsuperscript{13} Maxine Berg also links social with economic history. She analyses the burgeoning import trade in high-class ceramics and textiles from the fabled Orient. When such luxury wares are recovered from eighteenth-century shipwrecks, they still appeal to today’s consumers as they did to affluent purchasers in the eighteenth-century.\textsuperscript{14}

Other scholars, however, are more pessimistic, stressing the ‘economy of makeshifts’ by which the very poor struggled to survive. People took to crime, albeit not solely out of financial desperation – triggering historians into long-running debates about the nature of eighteenth-century crime and punishments.\textsuperscript{15}

Moreover, a statistical probing of the Old Bailey depositions has recalculated the long hours of workers’ toil, especially in response to high food prices during the prolonged war against France after 1793.\textsuperscript{16} Personal timetables are also revealed: the busiest hours for crime were 5.00-7.00pm, and for visiting prostitutes 9.00-10.00pm. A further big new study by Nigel Thrift and Paul Glennie confirms people’s awareness of precisely measured time. Such a cultural consciousness was apparent at the start of the century and was further boosted by
England’s thriving clock- and watch-making industry. Thus time-discipline had emerged long before the advent of factory-discipline from the 1780s onwards – here refuting the chronology posited by E.P. Thompson.17

Another glittering light amongst the galaxy comes from new studies of social and cultural dynamics, as summarised all too briefly here. Class relationships, especially class conflict, are not in fashion. But issues of gender, ethnicity and ‘identity’ (whether national or imperial) are much in vogue.18 Thus research indicates that there were more people with dark skins in eighteenth-century Britain than generally believed; and that indigenous reactions to immigrants were not invariably hostile. Gender definitions and sexual relationships also fail to uphold old stereotypes.19 Affluent men had variegated lifestyle options. Erotic literature welded old ideas with new medical attitudes to the body. Specialist ‘molly-houses’ provided meeting-places for homosexual men, whose cultural impact upon gender roles is still disputed. Male-female relationships were complexly negotiated within the household. Both sexes, among rich and poor alike, participated in the eighteenth-century’s culture of letter-writing. Whilst violence against women was far from unknown, it was also challenged at law. Meanwhile, there were far more female business-women playing active economic roles than is generally realised.20 And there was much unsung labour by domestic servants (usually women), as well as by the under-studied male manual labourers.

Men dominated the clubs and societies that characterised social life in this period, although some clubs did allow female attendance and, in a few cases, voting rights. These ad hoc organisations provided the basis for moral and political campaigns, such as the successful movement to abolish the slave trade. Scientists, professional men, and antiquaries were among the like-minded people who met in groups to advance their learning and status. Collectively, they fostered a British cultural enlightenment, not least in late eighteenth-century Scotland.21 They also contributed to the European-wide intellectual fermentation, whether challenging or defending traditional God-given authority in church and state. Out of the rejection of old hierarchy came a powerful new philosophy of individual ‘rights’. On that basis, indeed, early feminism gained some doughty male supporters.22

Vigorous debates, not least in the new newspaper press, were certainly a central
feature of eighteenth-century Britain. Nonetheless, many scholars reject the proposition that this era saw the advent of a novel ‘public sphere’ (being male, bourgeois and civic) in contrast to a separate domestic sphere (being female and domestic). This theory from the social philosopher Jörgen Habermas was in scholarly vogue for a while.\textsuperscript{23} It superseded earlier thematic debates about ‘Power/Knowledge’; ‘Politeness’; ‘Identity’. Yet the quest is now to find another organising proposition to test against the evidence of history – and probably to reject, as heated controversies also fuel the galaxy.

4: From Exploding Galaxy to Big History

Following upon splendid variety, what of the future? Continuing expansion and diversification can confidently be predicted. So can fruitful and at times infuriating cross-fertilisation between academic history and the media, which love the elite Georgian style.

A renewed quest for resynthesis will also prompt fresh Grand Narratives. One common quest has been to find the elusive onset of ‘Modernity’. Yet there is also scepticism about the validity of this concept, let alone its advent, which is attributed to many different centuries. So a small but growing number of scholars now reject the entire triadic stage theory of ancient/medieval/modern as misleading and positively unhelpful.\textsuperscript{24}

My prediction is therefore that the long eighteenth century will be increasingly compared and contrasted with other eras, within the new Big History (which actually means long-term history). It will, however, be done via new frameworks and new concepts – and, in these visual days, with a new abundance of apt illustrations. All exploding galaxies are fated to crash into other galaxies. The light from the conflagration will be tremendous.
ENDNOTES:

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1 Outputs for decade 1990-9 (checked Nov. 2009) from Royal Historical Society Bibliography (now Bibliography of British and Irish History: on-line). Please contact p.corfield@rhul.ac.uk for further details.


10 Compare C.J. Sommerville, The Secularisation of Early Modern Culture: From Religious


