POST-Medievalism/ Modernity/ Postmodernity?

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Abstract

Studying human history means studying the recoverable stock of past human experiences and the retrospective assessments of those experiences. But recent arguments about how and whether historians can study earlier times have not yet sufficiently highlighted the questions of periodisation. This essay urges that such a debate is long overdue. In practice, historians are eclectic and many invoke their own preferred timespans. Yet the collective ‘default’ system of the profession as currently institutionalised sticks with out-dated assumptions about the onset of the ancient world, medievalism, modernity, and (perhaps) postmodernity. However, did history really change so schematically? The suggested binary ‘breaks’ between Modernity and Postmodernity at some stage in the later twentieth century are shown, upon close examination, to be subjective and inconsistent, as well as lacking in specific chronology. It also remains unclear whether this binary shift is/was applicable solely to western societies or to the entire world. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding this supposed great transformation is as nothing in comparison with lack of clarity associated with the concept of Modernity and (not the same) Modernism. These confusions have been generated by historians and cultural critics who do believe that the past can be studied (here differing from theorists of Postmodernity); but who do not compare and contrast their own operating models. ‘Modernity’ is such a familiar term that its use seems unproblematic. The result is much repetition; but conceptual confusion. In fact, all the apparently ‘established’ chronologies have problems, including the Marxist variants of Feudalism, Capitalism, and Communism. So it is time for historians, who do believe that the past can be studied, to allow for multiple dimensions – continuity, gradual change, and revolutionary upheaval - within one period. In that way, the analysis can move beyond Post-post to study multi-layered experiences in the past as in the present.
Studying human history means studying the recoverable stock of past human experiences and the retrospective assessments of those experiences by many later generations. It makes for a multi-layered subject, that continually renews itself. As a contribution to that process, this essay returns to the under-debated issue of periodisation, which provides a diachronic framing for the collective history of humanity – a species notable for its capacity to ‘think long’, beyond the immediate moment.

Detecting ages and stages, and their succession through time, constitutes one popular method for attributing a broad-brush shape to the past. Change is built into the system, with a hint of inevitability. Opponents of the latest manifestation of the presumed Zeitgeist are, it is often implied, ‘behind the times’ rather than living fully in them. Yet history’s ages and stages do not come ready labelled. Instead, there is uncertainty about the nomenclature, the chronology and the characteristics of the proclaimed epochs, as well as uncertainty about how the sundry stages fit, even by implication, into an overall human history.

Postmodernity as a temporal span exemplifies the difficulties. Even when adults today consider the concept simply as the proposed name for a swathe of later twentieth-century history, through which they have all lived, they notably disagree. The emergence of Postmodernity is firmly endorsed by some; its evanescence proclaimed equally firmly by others (‘it is slipping into the strange history of those futures that did not materialise’);¹ whilst many more either dispute the concept, both theoretically and historically, or just ignore it entirely. To take one example, when Anthony Giddens dissects The Transformation of Intimacy ... in Modern Societies, he locates Modernity throughout the twentieth century. Postmodernity is unmentioned and un-indexed.²

Moreover, such fluidities of interpretation are not restricted to recent times. Modernity, the presumed precursor stage has a nomenclature
that is widely used but with a hazy definition and even hazier chronology. And the same applies to the precursor’s presumed precursor, Pre-modernity or Medievalism, as well as to many other temporal concepts, such as ‘the’ Renaissance, or ‘the’ Industrial Revolution.

The discussion that follows assesses both some general problems in ‘staging history’ and the specific dilemmas in detecting Postmodernity and Modernity - not to argue that retrospective judgements cannot be made but in order to move beyond the all-change ‘big-switch’ model of historical transformation.

Staging history

Ages and stages in history have an ancient pedigree. In traditional Hindu thought, times past are divided into immensely long Ages (Yuga), which succeed one another implacably. They are hard to date with precision but frame what has gone before and what is due to come. The four Ages Krita (gold), Treta (silver), Dvapara (bronze) and Kali (iron) together form great cycles (Mahayuga), lasting for thousands of millions of years. And many other cultures have invoked similar ideas, even if not with the same precisely specified timespans. Such successive stages offer a grand narrative of human history, which is at once reassuring, awe-inspiring, potentially constraining, yet also incorporating change.

For professional historians today, the options are equally multiple. Many currently avoid prolonged diachronic narratives, preferring synchronic ‘immersion’ within specific periods and/or themes. But for those who wish to take a long view, a de facto state of liberal choice obtains when deciding upon timespans and topics for coverage. Indeed, historians have not been halted by criticisms of their discipline, emanating from postmodernist theory, but are exploring an ever more ambitious range of themes, from the intimate to the abstract, from the material to the
ethereal, from the mathematically precise to the subjectively fuzzy, all with their different historical spans for analysis.

Underlying this fertile diversity, however, a somewhat traditional set of period divisions notably persists, providing a ‘default’ template. That has not been overthrown, despite being invalidated by the plethora of new research on the ground. The reasons for the template’s persistence are both intellectual and institutional. Most importantly, no new consensus narrative has emerged to overthrow the old period divisions. Hence there is no general agreement about alternatives; nor, indeed, any agreement that better period divisions are needed.

Furthermore, as the study of history has professionalised and globalised, the world’s 100,000+ professional historians and their colleagues, who study the long eras of so-called ‘pre-history’ before the advent of writing, have tended to specialise, being sub-divided into broad groupings defined by periods and/or themes. These known sub-divisions have then become educationally institutionalised, underpinning entire systems of teaching, examination, research funding, public assessment, professional self-organisation, and academic publication. While individual scholars pick and choose, the structures persist. Moreover, the ‘default’ stages also provide a pervasive if often poorly defined terminology of historic epochs, which is hard to ignore even by those who try to do so.

One classic ‘staged’ model of change, derived from Karl Marx, underpinned academic structures within the communist tradition. In simple outline, human societies are deemed to emerge via contrasting stages of economic production: from primitive tribalism, to ancient slave-owning, to feudal serfdom, to wage-based capitalism, and on to the (coming) post-propertied state of communism. Meanwhile, an older and rival model, formulated in the European-American tradition and now globally influential with many national variations, invokes a vaguer
‘culturalist’ version of change. Human experience is seen as developing via a prolonged ‘pre-history’ before writing was invented, through various early civilisations, leading to the clear ‘light’ of classical times, then falling into a much contested medieval ‘darkness’, and on to the new and better light of Modernity, sometimes with an early modern period inserted as a prelude to full Enlightenment. Each historic stage, in both these big models, is assumed to have its own discrete characteristics, with a typical form of polity, economy, society, culture, and concomitant ‘world-view’.

Such categories not only recount a story of change but provide building blocks for generating alternatives. If the supposed characteristics of one era are reconfigured, then history’s narrative drive changes too. For example, new research into the so-called medieval period has combated its old, dire image of darkness. And as the Middle Ages have grown ‘lighter’, so storm clouds have gathered over Modernity. Postmodern theorists have in particular challenged its supposedly ‘progressive’ image. Its ‘light’ has been re-interpreted as over-confidence, and its claimed faith in reason and science challenged as coldly rationalist, unfeeling, belligerent, totalising, and, ultimately, totalitarian. On that, postmodern revisionists are emphatic. The modernist world-view led to ‘the killing fields of mechanised warfare’, proclaims Charles Jencks. ‘Modernity was a long march to prison’, amends Zygmunt Bauman. Not everyone got there, but not for want of trying – whether by Stalin’s Russia, Hitler’s Germany, or Mao’s China. Indeed, many of their victims were killed, not ‘just’ imprisoned. So it is welcome, for postmodern theorists, to believe that the old ways have been superseded by a warier, often wearier, but wiser Postmodernity.

There is a certain paradox, however, in the promotion of this revised version of history. Postmodern theorists also warn that historians are fundamentally wrong-headed in their belief that they can tell true stories about the past. Scientific study is, incidentally, exempt from this
critique, so that geologists, biologists, and astronomers may still analyse the physical past of this planet, its living organisms, and the wider cosmos. Historians, however, are challenged over their aim to study human history and, especially, their aspiration to do so objectively. For the sceptical postmodernist, any such quest is at best an illusion, a ‘noble dream’. At worst, it is wrong-headed and foolishly unaware of its own inadequacy. Theorists of the postmodern stress instead the pastness of the past. They highlight the gulf between the accessibility of Now and the claimed inaccessibility of all ‘Time before now’. A paradigmatic warning comes from Michel Foucault: ‘The true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost events, without a landmark or a point of reference’.

Yet the very name Postmodernity makes a strong temporal claim of its own. It implies the possibility, after all, of identifying at least one landmark within the past (say) fifty or one hundred years: namely, a precursor stage that has now been superseded by a new condition not just of Anti-Modernity but positively Post-. The narrative components are altered but the story is still one of change. Cue architectural guru Charles Jencks, jovially: ‘The Post-Modern Movement has achieved a revolution in western culture without breaking anything more than a few eggheads’. Historical theorist Keith Jenkins confirms in 1997 the advent of something new: ‘Postmodernity is not an ideology or position we can choose to subscribe to or not, Postmodernity is precisely our condition’. And a decade later, feminist theorist Joan W. Scott in 2007 is equally clear: ‘Like it or not, we are in a post-modern age’. In their revised narrative, Time latest off-spring seems to be on the side of the critics of historical studies.

Worryingly, however, not all people in this new era accept its ethos. Joan Scott in 2007 also detects countervailing intellectual trends. In particular, too many of her fellow feminists reject postmodernist theory – and their refusal ‘is, I submit, a sign of the times.’ So the age is at once
postmodernist and counter-postmodernist. The new historical stage has apparently become an epistemological choice. Perhaps the restless Zeitgeist has already moved on? Post-postmodernity and post-poststructuralism are now proposed as the latest ‘latest thing’. And countless other Post-modes are mooted, ranging from the ‘post-industrial’ to the ‘post-feminist’ to the ‘post-human’ (artificial intelligence). These concepts exemplify a general sense of change, albeit by specifying what has gone rather than what has come. They further endorse, without proving, a vague belief that history proceeds by switching from one discrete stage to another, each with its own special characteristics. But it is that core assumption which leads to problems.

**Disputing Postmodernity**

If the departed Modernity is viewed as an iron age of totalitarianism, then there should be some hope in the new. Advocates of postmodernist architectural stylistics must joyously embrace the ‘jumping universe’, urges Charles Jencks, with characteristic verve. However, the intellectual stance of postmodernist theory is generally sombre. As the new era is one of flux and instability, so the matching worldview is one of critical doubt, laced with irony. ‘It [the postmodern mind] braces itself for a life without truths, standards, and ideals’. Existential uncertainty holds sway. History has thus produced not a new golden age but one of shifting sands.

However, such generalised verdicts about the state of ‘the times’ - whether newly minted or repeated as current clichés – often depend more upon confident assertion (asserto-proof) than they do upon detailed evidence. Is it the case that all aspects of human affairs today are more fluid, uncertain and shifting than ever before? Many of the disasters such as premature deaths from famine, disease, mal-nourishment, exploitation and mass killings are by no means unique to the present day. Indeed,
Jencks and Bauman both stress how grim and unsettling was the old Modernity. Meanwhile, today there are structured, as well as unsettled, features to observe. The growth of the Earth’s human population to over six billion people is not only a legitimate cause for ecological anxiety but also a sign of human resourcefulness and organisation, as the species that has outnumbered and globally out-territoried all mammalian rivals - other than the billions of rats with which humans still grudgingly co-exist.

Comparative anxiety levels over time are singularly hard to calibrate, not only because immediate challenges often seem more real than past ones but also because people’s stoicism or otherwise in the face of hardships may vary in different cultural contexts. A set of essays about the current Age of Anxiety was certainly published in 1996. Its authors fretted: ‘As our choices appear to expand and our sense of control appears to diminish, how do we stop ourselves from being frightened of the future?’

But books with that title were newly produced in Britain in 1963, 1953, 1946 and 1899 (and no doubt at other times elsewhere). Again, a text on the current Age of Doubt appeared, as if on postmodernist cue, in 1988. The same title, however, was also used about the years 1966, 1934, 1914, 1896 and 1890. Indeed, tracts on ‘troubles’ appear plentifully in hazardous times (provided that the press is uncensored), while words of woe and worry are even more ubiquitous (provided that people are able to speak freely) – although lamentations may be freely exaggerated as well as sedulously accurate. ‘See America ruined!’ pronounced a British tract on The Signs of the Times in 1781, certifying disaster for the blood-drenched rebel colonists and their commerce, family life, and religion, under the yoke of their ‘tyrannical’ Congress.

Specifically, the implications of globalising commerce and new technologies of super-fast communication are identified by postmodern theorists as constituting the root causes of today’s claimed rise in anxiety.
Neither process is intrinsically fatal, of course. But, in combination, they may be psychologically destabilising, especially for the first generation of people who grapple with the shock of the new. Furthermore, technological innovations, linked with globalising commerce, have a substantial impact upon patterns of employment, providing novel and skilled work for some but deskilling or eroding the livelihood of others.

Again, however, such developments have a long and complicated history. The spread of global markets and global cultural interactions by no means began in the later twentieth century. Nor is that the only period to see ‘revolutions’ in communications. Thus one eloquent account of the dizzying impact of globalisation and transport change dates from 1848,\textsuperscript{24} in terms which might almost have been penned by a postmodernist today:

\ldots everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudice and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air; all that is holy is profaned; …

But those words come from Marx and Engels in the \textit{Communist Manifesto}, even though their Marxist ideology is habitually taken by postmodern theorists as constituting a classic case of ‘totalising’ modernist thought.

Much of the trouble in pinning down big changes in human affairs stems from recourse to binary models of transformation, which depict societies, economies and cultures as switching or travelling collectively through history from one state to another. For Marx, it was axiomatic that the ‘superstructure’ of ideas must ‘in the last resort’ match the economic ‘infrastructure’; or, in Hegel’s thought that so influenced Marx, it was the obverse view that the ‘Ideal’ set the criteria for the ‘Material’ world.\textsuperscript{25} Such loosely Hegelian/Marxist assumptions, that ages must be all-of-a-piece, encourage a historical tidy-mindedness, so that one era of
‘confident, totalitarian’ Modernity is compared and contrasted with the next age of ‘sceptical, pluralist’ Postmodernity.

In practice, however, there may be multiple trends and attitudes within communities, especially in open and diversified societies during times of change. Postmodernist theorists who ignore such possibilities turn out to be using the same reifying and totalising strategies that are deplored as being among the ‘cardinal sins’ of modernist thought.26

Tensions come from the simultaneous need to generalise and to qualify generalisations. Some analysts of the postmodern do give prior disclaimers that there is no rigid binary divide. Elements overlap, it is conceded. Hence the postmodern is said to be ‘double-coded’, both refuting the modern while sharing its Modernity. Yet such relationships are not easily configured within normal temporal sequences. Thus Jean-François Lyotard’s foundational analysis of ‘the postmodern condition’ muddied the waters by stating that: ‘It [the postmodern] is undoubtedly a part of the modern. … A work can become modern only if it is first postmodern’.27 His playful reversal of temporality meshes with the hostility to linear time expressed by many others within this school of thought. ‘Postmodern narrative language undermines historical time and substitutes for it a new construction of temporality’, declares Elizabeth Ermarth.28 The preferred perspective is rhythmic, with ‘swing’ but without recountable linearity. Hence Lyotard famously defined new postmodernist thought as characterised by an ‘incredulity towards meta-narratives’.29

On the other hand, even a looping history may tell a story. The retention of the concept of ‘the modern’ still implies at least one prior and older stage, whether medieval or ancient (although these theorists are not particularly concerned with what happened before Modernity). And the post-mode is itself a temporal concept, implying a ‘before’ and an ‘after’.

To help with the processes of identification, some binary listings of
definitional criteria have been propounded. One oft-cited set came from Ihab Hassan, the Egyptian-American literary pundit.\textsuperscript{30} Having warned that dichotomies are deceptive,\textsuperscript{31} he then nominated 33 cultural contrasts between modernism and postmodernism (see Appendix Table 1, pp. 27-9). The listing is scintillating and suggestive, but schematic and in places perverse. Some of Hassan’s verdicts are obscure, such as the alleged switch from Modernist \textit{Symptom} to Postmodernist \textit{Desire}. Other contrasts are hard to define, let alone to prove, such as a shift from \textit{Transcendence} to \textit{Immanence}. Yet more are debateable, like the change from Modernist \textit{Form} to Postmodernist \textit{Anti-form}. Those who complete today’s ever-growing number of bureaucratic questionnaires may smile wryly at such a thought. \textit{Form} and forms have not yet vanished.

Big trends, moreover, can be complicatedly diverse. It could be claimed that a new \textit{Anti-form} has arrived with the world-wide web. Some experts trumpet its importance as an untrammelled network that is revolutionising global knowledge and communications, although in arguing that case Thomas Friedman does not do so in the name of Postmodernity.\textsuperscript{32} But, again, while the web is notably eclectic in its content and outreach, it also has a semi-concealed \textit{Form} of its own. It relies upon a complex electronics industry, with both systematic hardware and integrally coded software, as well as being subject to differing degrees of political and legal regulation in different parts of the world,\textsuperscript{33} let alone being policed by the users’ own choices of virus protection. As a result, the web is poised between its potential for order and change (or both together), rather than representing total upheaval.

Generalised categories in themselves tend to be so broad that some evidence is bound to fit, while other items do not. Another binary listing comes from Charles Jencks (see Appendix Table 2, pp. 30-3).\textsuperscript{34} He boldly spans the gamut from politics to economics to science, religion, media and
philosophy (although gender, which often features in summaries of recent social changes, is somewhat surprisingly excluded). Again, the listing is suggestive and stimulating but overly schematic and open to challenge. To take one example along many, Jencks views the Modern world as *totalitarian* and the Postmodern as *democratic*. Yet the profound disputes, sometimes the global wars, which have taken place between conflicting political systems in both the claimed epochs receive no mention.

Religion, moreover, is a theme upon which the two much-quoted listings flatly disagree. For Jencks, the modern era is *Atheistic* and the postmodern *Pantheistic*, while Hassan contrasts a modernist *God the Father* with a postmodernist *Holy Ghost*. How to test these propositions remains unclear. Hassan’s categories seem unduly restricted to the Christian tradition and even, within that, highlight two of the Trinity while ignoring the current evangelical emphasis upon Christ as a ‘personal saviour’. Meanwhile, Jencks’s claimed shift from no religion to the worship of many gods excludes from both modern and postmodern eras (however defined) the world’s huge numbers of monotheists. In particular, his binaries were clearly devised before the current surging debates within and about the role of Islam in the contemporary world. His schema is thus too static as well as too schematic. Where are today’s pantheists? And how do atheists, agnostics and don’t-cares fit into the historical model?

Even the solid monuments of architecture have not proved sufficiently durable in style to identify *Zeitgeist* changes with any clarity. In consumerist societies, fashions are restless and competitive, rather than sweeping the board by switching from one era-style to another. Thus the new vogue for low-rise constructions in the West in the 1970s was taken to indicate a paradigmatic new Postmodernity. But the old high-rise did not disappear, and indeed has since made a fashionable comeback, with architects mixing from many modes. Jencks himself classifies the stylistic

A key uncertainty, in all these claims, relates to whether the Zeitgeist changes are supposed to apply to the entire world or just to the urban-industrial societies of the West. It seems to smack of undue cultural self-importance to define global history in terms of changes allegedly taking place in just one part of the planet. Moreover, while there are some detectable world-wide trends (such as urbanisation or spreading literacy), these tend to be slow in unfolding, with many variations from place to place and over time. As Haider Khan, who does still endorse the stage-terminology, observes: ‘this postmodern world is characterised by a high degree of unevenness so that political, economic and social contexts range from premodern to postmodern in almost every corner of the globe’.

Given such complexities, it is not surprising that the chronology of the alleged shift from Modernity to Postmodernity is hazy. There is no one date or event that is taken as the symbolic moment. (Nor need there be, of course). The historian Arnold Toynbee was one emphatic early user of the term. He viewed ‘Modernity’ as synonymous with peace and ‘progress’, its ending being signalled either by the late nineteenth-century advent of mass democracy or, more definitively, by the carnage of the First World War. Various cultural commentators also adopted the term to discuss stylistic changes in their own times. It was used in Spanish in the 1930s, sparsely in English in the 1950s, and then, more prolifically in the 1970s, especially but not exclusively referencing new architectural fashions in the West. For Jencks, the cultural break had its ‘first phase’ in the 1960s and was then crystallised the mid-1970s. Cultural geographer David Harvey more precisely dated the sea-change in cultural as well as political-
economic practices to *circa* 1972.\(^3\) And in 1979 Lyotard published his influential account of the contemporary *Postmodern Condition*.

Meanwhile, Ihab Hassan had suggested that the outbreak of war in September 1939 constituted a significant fulcrum of change, if a date had to be chosen.\(^4\) But another touted option came fully 50 years later, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The collapse of European communism marked a political turning-point, which could be analysed as ending one of Modernity’s grand narratives, even if devoted Marxists protest that ‘true’ communism is yet to come. The *Marxisant* critic Fredric Jameson did his best to bridge the gap by declaring postmodernism to be the cultural form of ‘late’ capitalism, implying that both would shortly expire from venerability.\(^5\) But all these changes are hard to align. By the 1990s postmodern architecture was losing popularity but the pace of world-wide communications was being sped by the coming of the internet. In short, transformations in warfare, politics, society, economics, culture, gender relations, science, technology, art, architecture, and ideas were not happening to a common timetable, but at variegated paces and often conflictually – with many trends being contested at any one time.

Many features claimed as typical of the new postmodern era appear long before its assumed arrival, and many of those associated with the old ‘Modernity’ continue long after its assumed demise.\(^6\) Indeed, insofar as the latter was or is anything like an organised ‘project’, it remains unfinished, as Jürgen Habermas has urged.\(^7\) No doubt for these reasons, even some who endorse the concept of Postmodernity are becoming wary. The philosopher Richard Rorty calls its terminology ‘slippery and misleading’.\(^8\) ‘Exasperating’, adds Hans Bertens, also finding it ‘deeply problematical almost right from the start’.\(^9\) That view is reiterated too by a theologian, musing on faith and postmodernism in 1997: ‘While we are probably stuck, for the moment, with the terminology
of postmodernism, there is no attendant clarity about [its] meaning.\textsuperscript{46}

Both casual usages and serious applications of the concept appear to be ebbing in the early twenty-first century. A bibliometric count of book titles (as recorded in the British Library catalogue) referring to ‘Postmodernity’, ‘Postmodernism’ or the ‘Postmodern’ shows a very gently rising trend from the mid-1970s, increasing in the 1990s, with a peak of 176 books in 2000, but a falling trend from 2002 onwards, with no more than 74 relevant titles published in 2006.\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, such publications constitute only a tiny proportion of the torrential output of works that discuss today’s world and its problems, without any reference to this problematic term. In sum, there seems to be a considerable ‘incredulity’ about Postmodernity as a phase of world-history.

**Diffusing Modernity**

Historians are generally dismissive about the intended onslaught upon their discipline. Unalloyed postmodernist scepticism seems to lead but to a quagmire of nescience. On the other hand, historians and their publishers, who often propose the titles of history books, are presiding over a morass of their own, relating to ‘Modernity’. In this case, the issues at stake are not consciously related to epistemology. Most historians who write about the ‘modern’ world (however defined) tend to use the term descriptively, even as a default concept, rather than polemically, unlike theorists of postmodernism whose terminology is a badge of philosophical allegiance.

That is not to deny the existence of epistemological debates about the study of history. Not only have historians long argued amongst themselves about methodologies and approaches\textsuperscript{48} but, in the later twentieth century, they became aware of the postmodernist challenge. The result, however, has not splintered or halted the discipline. Instead, it has tended to foster rapprochement between the specialist branches of the
subject, as historians unite around the belief that the past can be studied effectively, even if very diversely, and with varying degrees of certainty.

Periodisation, however, has generally remained unreformed. Thus Modernity as a key temporal state retains its paramount name recognition. For every one book title in 2007 about the ‘postmodern’, there were more than 20 analysing the ‘modern’. But that term remains super-elastic. It can refer simply to the ‘contemporary’, so that, if the present-day is justly named as postmodern, then it is a ‘modern postmodernism’. That would retrospectively suit Baudelaire’s definition of Modernity as representing ‘the transitory, the fugitive, the contingent’ – all features that its theorists see in Postmodernity. Yet the ‘modern’ can also be applied to a specific era, allegedly with its own character, its own start date, and its own ending (if it has yet ended). No specifics are agreed. So upon close inspection Modernity proves to be well known but of no fixed historical address.

What moment is epic enough to launch its birth? Confidently in 1821, a historian had no trouble in identifying a long-ago spiritual marker, with the advent of Christ in year 1 AD (or Year 1 of the Common Era, in global notation). But no. It was the fall of the Roman Empire in 475CE that really marked the birth of ‘modern Europe’, according to an alternative historical chronology published in 1810. But for yet other authorities the similarly elastic ‘Middle Ages’ intervened between ancient and modern, leaving the birth of ‘true’ Modernity to be further debated.

Centrally, the concept offers a strong ‘change’ narrative, implying that there was once a different society, which has mutated into something distinctly new - with elements that persist to this day, since the modern also means the ‘contemporary’. Hence using the term signals a view of the past as not ‘dead’, not ‘irrelevant’. In fact, the value of studying history, the world’s reservoir of experience, does not need the prop of ‘modern’ terminology. Nonetheless, its immediate resonance may especially inspire
publishers, with an eye to sales, to encourage its deployment.

Striking phrases accordingly abound, but with utterly variant chronologies. *The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1210-1685* (2007) offers a nearly five-hundred-year gestation period for Modernity, while simultaneously published is *The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare*, with a compact focus upon the years 1799-1815. Meanwhile, the alternative date of 1688/9 is proposed for *The Creation of the Modern World* (2006), following Britain’s constitutional upheaval that tamed the Stuart monarchy, although another expert prefers a mid-nineteenth-century gestation as reflected in the works of the social theorist *Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life* (2007).

Sandwiched between these four studies lurks, unmentioned, the history of eighteenth-century Europe. Yet that remains the prime time and place that is generally understood to include the heartlands of Enlightenment and Modernity. So when postmodernist critics wish to castigate the failures of both processes, it is this period to which they point. In particular, they adopt the phrase first coined by the twentieth-century philosopher Alistair Macintyre who defined the target aims of consciously ‘modern’ thought as the ‘Enlightenment project’. It is a reified term that implies a common endeavour – either being undertaken (improbably) by eighteenth-century Europe’s argumentative philosophers and statesmen or (even more improbably) by Europe’s war-wracked population of approximately 150 million inhabitants in 1800.

‘Modernity’ is thus taken not so much as a problematic to define but as an ‘available’ concept that is somehow linked with the present. It has not only many birthdates but many birthplaces too. David Rollison finds the *Local Origins of Modern Society* in Gloucestershire in Britain’s West Country, with a long gestation from 1500 to 1800. ‘The world is
what it is today because of what happened in the most dynamic parts of the world in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’, he stresses.61 Or the real location was across the Atlantic, in a new study of America and the Growth of the Modern World, 1788-1800.62 By contrast, Christopher Bayly’s Birth of Modernity is a macrocosmic global process, with a long, but differently long timespan, from 1780 to 1914: ‘Modernity began at the end of the eighteenth century and has continued up to the present day in various forms’.63 Of these three further chronologies, only some 20 years overlap, and the locations are variegated.

Arguably, these different approaches can be reconciled, at least to an extent, by claiming that the various authors are studying subtly different aspects of one large and complex process. Nonetheless, the diversity is very notable and the definition of the core process is extremely eclectic. Moreover, the chronologies are further complicated when applied differently, and again without consensus, to different countries. So, for example, one expert sees ‘modern’ Mexico as emerging in 1821 with independence from Spain; while two others equate Mexican Modernity with the Mexican ‘Revolution’ of 1910-17, almost a century later, although yet another authority highlights avant-garde art in the 1920s and 1930s as heralding Mexico’s modern moment.64 All these claims are made with equal confidence. Spain meanwhile is slow off the mark, according to Raymond Carr’s Modern Spain, 1875-1980, but – No: it just manages to beat its former colony to Modernity after all, according to Juan Pablo Fusi and Jordi Palafox with their study of España, 1808-1996: El desafío de la modernidad [Spain, 1808-1996: The Challenge of Modernity].65

None of this variegation is particularly surprising, since numerous publications announcing the Birth of the Modern or some approximation (‘creation’, ‘invention’, ‘origins’) have appeared during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, nominating key eras of modern gestation from the
thirteenth to the twentieth centuries – a lengthy span of 800 years.\textsuperscript{66}

Familiarity guarantees the term its continued usage and its widespread usage then guarantees its familiarity. ‘As for the word “Modernity”, it too will be used in a free and easy way, in hopes that most readers know it when they see it’, writes T.J. Clark, side-stepping the chore of definition entirely.\textsuperscript{67} But the mixture of fuzziness in application, coupled with an excess freighting of meanings, will surely sink the terminology before too long, in favour of more expressive indicators.

Experts who identify ‘Modernity’ may be referring to any or all of the following historical processes, in varying combinations: urbanisation; the unparalleled surge in population growth, the spread of globalised commerce and consumerism; industrialisation; new and ever-speedier technologies of communication; a reliance upon science and applied technology; belief in ‘progress’; pluralist and innovative cultures; the growth of literacy; relative secularisation and acceptance of religious diversity; the spread of democratic government and the promulgation of individual rights; the extension of state bureaucracies; the advent of international institutions, laws and conventions; the ending of formal empires; transformations in gender roles; timetabled lives; a cult of ‘forwards’ thinking; and/or a pervasive sense of being ‘modern’.

Critics might add: mass warfare; mass genocides; mass famines; mass epidemics; mass state repressions. But optimists might seek to include the campaigns (easier to announce than to achieve) against all forms of slavery; against disease and poverty; for ecological awareness; and for animal welfare. And so on throughout recent history. Some of these processes can be defined and quantified; but others are not easily ‘nailed’. The further possibility that these variegated developments may have differing timetables, applications, outcomes, and meanings, in different places around the globe, some trends appearing universally, some
very widely, and some only partially, has not been thoroughly confronted. At least, the term’s scope makes for good discussions. Yet when ‘Modernity’ is compared with another variable, the answer is always ‘complex’: as in studies of Jewishness and Modernity\textsuperscript{68} or twentieth-century England and Modernity.\textsuperscript{69} Encompassing so many things, it has elements that can be selected either for approval (modern womanhood)\textsuperscript{70} or for blame (modern women \textit{and} men)\textsuperscript{71} or for half-admiration, half-disgust (modern consumerism and worldliness),\textsuperscript{72} without any difficulty.

Partnering a fuzzy Modernity, there is, unsurprisingly, a further degree of ambiguity about the timing and status of Modernism. Whereas Postmodernism is understood as the mirror-matching cultural condition of Postmodernity, in the case of its precursor state there is no similar equation. So here the process and its prime cultural form do not automatically march in step. ‘Modernity’ may, depending upon each historian’s interpretation, have begun long or very long before ‘Modernism’ emerged in the West in the early twentieth century as a self-conscious literary, artistic and architectural vogue.

Or did it? Was there anything as coherent as the ‘Modernist’ terminology implies? Even specialists on the subject hesitate. Cultural Modernism is ‘notoriously inhospitable to definition’.\textsuperscript{73} It is ‘a highly troublesome signifier’, which indeed ‘may seem intolerably vague’.\textsuperscript{74} ‘There is a debate about when it [Modernism] really got started, whether it can be thought of as a homogeneous phenomenon, and what its key characteristics might be’.\textsuperscript{75} Hence it is best treated as a ‘loose and capacious notion’.\textsuperscript{76} As art historian Lisa Tickner observes, gingerly: ‘There is more than one kind of Modernism (and Modernity) at stake’.\textsuperscript{77}

Here the obscurity of yet another term that is widely known but under-defined seems to call for some creative new nomenclature. If ‘Modernism’ were renamed, then the problems of deciding upon its
relationship with ‘Modernity’ would be less intractable. The two processes (if they be but two) would not be expected to match in chronology or definition. But it is hard to find alternative terms that command general agreement. Hence ‘Modernism’ is, according to yet another expert, ‘vague - but unavoidable’.\textsuperscript{78} It offers an opaque umbrella under whose shelter the commentators can make their own choice of dates and preferred themes.

Putting everything together, however, was important to the ‘postmodernist project’. As it evolved into a cultural/ philosophical stance, it had two target ‘others’ in its sights. One was architectural Modernism in the interwar years, with steel-and-concrete high-rise buildings that ‘punched the sky’. Enemies to be admired but routed were Walter Gropius at the Bauhaus, and Le Corbusier of Marseilles’ \textit{Cité Radieuse} fame. The other target was the so-called ‘Enlightenment project’ of the eighteenth century, flying the flag of reason, science, utopianism, and a ‘total’ vision. As Modernism and Modernity respectively, these were the yoked phenomena to be superseded by Postmodernity. The yawning gap in the chronologies was bridged by rhetorical flair. Thus Charles Jencks swept the Renaissance into the equation as well, explaining that: ‘Modernity, as a condition, grew out of the Renaissance, until, in the nineteenth century, it gave birth to cultural modernism’.\textsuperscript{79} Why such a prolonged pause intervened was left unclear. But the implication was that post-Renaissance art and culture was lengthily ‘modern’, well before it became ‘modernist’.

Missing from these scenarios is an acknowledgement of ferment and diversity, not only over time but simultaneously. Perhaps early ‘closed’ cultures might have one ‘standard’ cultural form. But open, pluralist, and commercial communities often contain diversity and debate, mingling old and new. So the thinkers of Enlightenment Europe were not all secular rationalists, intent on utopian reforms. Indeed, while religious thought was being adapted, spiritualism had by no means vanished.\textsuperscript{80}
Moreover, in *Candide* (1759) Voltaire, the archetypical *philosophe*, mocked a blind faith in progress (whether secular or otherwise), with what might be termed a proto-‘postmodern’ irony – unless his spirited irreverence towards gods and kings be designated ‘post-mediieval’ instead.

Complex cultures are complex. So too the clumsily-named artistic vogue of early twentieth-century Modernism was not typical of its entire society. It was controversial, shocking. Virginia Woolf lived through the excitement of social, sexual, and literary experimentation, yet recalled that change was neither simple nor instantaneous: ‘While we looked into the future, we were completely under the power of the past.’81 Nor indeed did she shed all the social snobberies and ethnic prejudices of her class and background, as literary historians have revealed.82 Thus Woolf’s experience was symptomatic of cultural experimentation – partly differing from her wider society and enjoying the shock/horror responses she generated; but partly inheriting and internalising older attitudes and assumptions, often without fully realising how much. Such contrasts are very common in periods of self-conscious innovation, whether in the name of Modernity or any other cult of the New. An initial rejection of the ‘dead hand’ of the past, and a sense of a definitive ‘break’ in history, morphs into an awareness of complexity, and the welding of old and new.

Especially in eras of economic and cultural exchange on a global basis, heterogeneity applies. Postmodernist thought is another example of a cultural strand with its own specific social and historical context, rather than a cultural norm that erases the past and reconstitutes the entire world in its image.

Old and new are continually fused, contested, retained, adapted, lost, refound. To take another quite different example: when writing of the present-day role of India’s semi-nomadic bards and entertainers, the Bhats of Rajasthan, Jeremy Snodgrass argues distinctly that:83
This manner in which Bhats alternately seem to be traditional, modern, or even postmodern – and surely this diversity is related to the various ways so-called Modernity and Postmodernity are defined – makes problematic the idea that either tradition or Modernity, as a set of essential qualities or features, is easily localised in this community.

As in twenty-first-century Rajasthan, so globally.

Post-Post

Very much more could be said about the problems of periodisation. The ‘Medieval’ era has its own problems of nomenclature and timetabling. Similar many of the great organising concepts of historical description have faced definitional and chronological challenges: the Renaissance, the English Revolution, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution.

Marxists and those in the loosely continuing Marxist tradition fare no better. Just as the ‘medieval’ and ‘modern’ are queried, so are the ‘feudal’ and ‘capitalist’. To take one notorious example, across a large tract of ‘modern’ America in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries there flourished the ‘ancient’ mode of slavery. Such reliance upon ‘pre-feudal’ labour relationships seemed to come from two stages ‘backwards’ in history. True, the economy of American Deep South has been thoughtfully re-interpreted as plantation capitalism. It makes for better history. Yet ‘capitalism’ as a concept has been undermined (losing its supposed equation of commercialism with waged labour) and the clear succession of historical stages has been subverted (hybrid sub-stages muddling the clear sequence from feudalism to capitalism and onwards.)

Collectively, stadial models are good at highlighting dramatic and fundamental macro-changes, which of course do happen upon occasions. On the other hand, very long, slow gradual trends are not so easy to fit into such schema. For example, the gradual, if far from regular, process of
urbanisation has brought over 50% of the world’s population in the early twenty-first century to live in towns (and many more to depend upon urban economies for their livelihoods), while elements of significant urban growth have been logged over many long eras, whether named as ‘medieval/feudal’, ‘modern/capitalist’ or ‘postmodern/late-capitalist’.

Deep continuities have also been obscured by the emphasis upon historical stages. Some features may not change greatly over time, or change only outwardly. Fernand Braudel long ago drew attention to the constant framing role of geo-history, although he saw global geography as more static than it actually is. But there has been far too little discussion or theorisation about the power of continuity, especially when compared with the volume of writings about revolutionary change. One question relates to the fundamentals (if any) of ‘human nature’. Historians and philosophers generally share a suspicion of the interpretation emanating from neo-Darwinist Evolutionary Psychologists in the 1990s. This school of thought was not troubled by modish postmodernist doubt but was utterly certain that, far from changing over time, humans retain a ‘Stone Age’ mentality for all behaviour relating to sex and reproduction. The assumed model of behaviour is far too heterosexist to be universally applicable. Nonetheless, such questions of deep continuity remain valid topics for debate, alongside the more obvious cases of change.

Responding to the uncertainties attached to all these analytical categories, the theorists of Postmodernity might comment that the impossibility of studying the past objectively has been further exemplified. The problems in establishing the emergence of their preferred view are thus explicable, indeed inevitable. However, that does not dispose of the issue. The present is not ring-fenced from the past. Some of it is ‘dead’ but some lives. Moreover, as already noted, humans have the capacity to ‘think long’. All commentators about current and recent times are de facto
making statements about history. Assumptions and assertions about the past are unavoidable. The better challenge is to study history better – a task that is not easy but is defined by its difficulties, no more and no less.

Plural economic pathways\textsuperscript{89} and complex cross-cultural encounters\textsuperscript{90} are now coming onto the research agenda. Time\textsuperscript{91} and the big picture are being studied in different ways. There is no need to jettison the fruits of the fertile researches of past historians. Yet there is a need to deepen the explanatory frameworks, and the ‘big-switch’ terminology that goes with them. It is not a question of renaming the stages but instead of moving beyond lists of stadial all-change, to think ‘post’ the post-mode.

**Through-time Dimensionality**

So my essay does not end with a call for yet another ‘new history’. That just replays the stereotypical ‘change’ game. A binary switch invokes once more the well-known but fallacious trope that a bad old system is about to mutate into the ‘new, improved’ model.\textsuperscript{92}

Instead, a longitudinally three-dimensional history builds upon what has gone before but seeks a better language and conceptualisation. It continues to study the dramatic macro-changes that are often invoked as defining the historical ‘breaks’ and revolutions, which frame significant eras. But there is more. Three-dimensionality includes very long-term micro-changes, which may take long centuries to unfold, spilling out beyond neat stages. Furthermore, the unjustly neglected power of continuity is also incorporated. Its force, whether characterised positively as providing stability and ballast, or hostiley as clogging the system with inertia, ‘domesticates’ change and works to contain the shock of the new.\textsuperscript{93}

Turmoil; momentum; persistence: these elements intersect and cross-impact in complexly different ways in different eras and climes. The result is that history is never static. Yet earlier activities are not all so
sundered by time that they are incomprehensible to later generations. That is why the past, as the great reservoir of experience, is carefully studied and debated, including by postmodern theorists. So the capacity to ‘think long’, beyond the synchronic moment, defines how humans live in a time-space, which is at once familiar, evolving, and turbulent.
## Appendix: Table 1

Ihab Hassan’s 33 modernism/postmodernism binaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modernism</th>
<th>Postmodernism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Romanticism/ Symbolism</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pataphysics/ Dadaism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form (conjunctive, closed)</td>
<td>Anti-form (disjunctive, open)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Play</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>Chance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Anarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mastery/ Logos</td>
<td>Exhaustion/ Silence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art Object/ Finished Work</td>
<td>Process/ Performance/ Happening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation/ Totalisation</td>
<td>Decreation/ Deconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthesis</td>
<td>Antithesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Absence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centering</td>
<td>Dispersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genre/ Boundary</td>
<td>Text/ Intertext</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semantics</td>
<td>Rhetoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paradigm</td>
<td>Syntagm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypotaxis</td>
<td>Parataxis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphor</td>
<td>Metonymy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection</td>
<td>Combination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root/ Depth</td>
<td>Rhizome/ Surface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation/ Reading</td>
<td>Against Interpretation / Misreading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signified</td>
<td>Signifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lisible</em> (Readerly)</td>
<td><em>Scriptible</em> (Writerly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative/ Grande Histoire</td>
<td>Anti-narrative/ Petite Histoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Code</td>
<td>Idiolect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symptom</td>
<td>Desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Mutant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genital/ Phallic</td>
<td>Polymorphous/ Androgynous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paranoia</td>
<td>Schizophrenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin/ Cause</td>
<td>Difference- Differance/ Trace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God the Father</td>
<td>The Holy Ghost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphysics</td>
<td>Irony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determinacy</td>
<td>Indeterminacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendence</td>
<td>Immanence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:**
## Appendix: Table 2

Charles Jencks’s 36 modern/ postmodern binaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Modern</th>
<th>Postmodern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation-states</td>
<td>Regions/ supranational bodies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalitarian</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>Contested consensus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class friction</td>
<td>New agenda issues / Green</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economics</th>
<th>Modern</th>
<th>Postmodern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fordism</td>
<td>Post-Fordism (networking)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly capital</td>
<td>Regulated socialised capitalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralised</td>
<td>Decentralised world economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society (First World)</th>
<th>Modern</th>
<th>Postmodern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High growth</td>
<td>Steady state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>Post-industrial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class-structured</td>
<td>Many clustered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proletariat</td>
<td>Cognitariat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purism</td>
<td>Double-coding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elitism (cultural)</td>
<td>Elite/ mass dialogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectivism</td>
<td>Values in nature</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aesthetics</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simple harmonies</td>
<td>Disharmonious harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newtonian represented</td>
<td>Big Bang represented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top-down integrated</td>
<td>Conflicted semiosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahistorical</td>
<td>Time-binding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophy</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monism</td>
<td>Pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialism</td>
<td>Semiotic view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utopian</td>
<td>Heterotopian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World of Print</td>
<td>Electronic/ reproductive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast-changing</td>
<td>Instant/ world changing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Science

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanistic</th>
<th>Self-organising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linear</td>
<td>Non-linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterministic</td>
<td>Creative/open</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newton mechanics</th>
<th>Quantum / chaos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atheism</td>
<td>Pantheism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘God is Dead’</td>
<td>Creation-centred spirituality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriarchal</td>
<td>Post-patriarchal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disenchantment</td>
<td>Re-enchantment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and World-view … continued p. 33
## Worldview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanical</th>
<th>Ecological</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reductive</td>
<td>Holistic/ holonic/ interconnected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>Interrelated/ semi-autonomous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>Heterarchical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidental universe</td>
<td>Anthropic principle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:**
Acknowledgements:

The author extends warm thanks to Tony Belton, William Gallois, Uriel Heyd, Keith Jenkins, Xabier Lamikiz, Robert Poole, and John Tosh, for their debates, disagreements, and critical readings, as well as perennial gratitude to the many colleagues who have shared in ‘talking time’ over the years – and especially all those attending Roehampton University’s

*Time & History Symposium* in March 2007.

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**Endnotes – from full sources as listed below pp. 37-40**

8. For the application of this phrase, coined by T. Clarke Smith in 1934, see Novick (1988), p. vii; and passim.
9. For key introductions to the range of postmodernist thought, see Bertens (1995); Drolet (2004); Jencks (1992); Jenkins (1997); Munslow (1997; 2006); Rose (1991).
15. Ibid., p. 33.
20. Ibid., pp. ix, xxii-iv.
For the superstructure/infrastructure binary, see Wetter (1968); Rosen (1982); and for a pertinent critique of its use in theories of twentieth-century German ‘modernisation’, see Lorenz (1986), esp. pp. 181-2, 190-4.

Four cardinal sins of modernist thought are defined as Reductionism; Reification; Essentialism; and Functional teleology: Sibeon (2007), p. 29.


Hassan (1982); pp. 263-7.


Toynbee (1939), p. 43.


British Library catalogue search, 25 Feb. 2008, for publications per annum between 1975 and 2006 with title words Postmodern, Postmodernity or Postmodernism.

For critical polemics, see Himmelfarb (1987; 2004); Black (2008); while a qualified optimism can be read in Gunn (2006); Tosh (2008).

See the significant title of Evans (1997).


Thomson (1821).

Fawkes (1810), p. [iii].


Bell (2007).


Francis (2007).

See, with diverse emphases, Israel (2006); Porter (2000); and Himmelfarb (2004).


Winik (2007).


For a mildly humorous look at modern womanhood in the early twenty-first century, see Anon. (2006); and for her glamorous incarnation in the 1920s, see Conor (2004).

Jones (1993) for a Catholic critique, especially of sexual immorality, including (p. 259) the dictum that ‘AIDS is a fitting epitaph for our [twentieth] century’.


Evolutionary Psychology seems to have passed its peak of popularity; but for articulate advocacy, see Buss (1999).

Eisenstadt (1994) and idem (1987). See examples in Bala (2006); Faawaz and Bayly (2002); and the critique of binaries in Lorenz (1986).

Gallois (2007). With thanks to a discussant at the Roehampton Conference (2007), who noted this risk.

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